Europe's moment of truth

A European summit is taking place in Brussels today that appears to be just another routine meeting: discussion of new sanctions against Russia, how to use frozen Russian assets to help Ukraine, plans for common defence. But beneath these technical topics, something far bigger is at play: Europe has reached a crossroads where it can finally become an autonomous geopolitical actor, or definitively discover it lacks the capacity to do so.

The context: when allies disagree

To understand why this moment is so important, we need to look at what's happening around Europe.

The Trump-Putin meeting that was supposed to take place in Budapest in the coming weeks? It's been put on ice. After US Secretary of State Rubio spoke with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, Washington realised that Moscow isn't willing to make any real concessions. No immediate ceasefire, just the usual maximalist demands. Trump made it clear he doesn't want to "waste time" with another summit that leads nowhere.

This US-Russia impasse puts Europe in a particular position. On one hand, it still depends on the Americans for security; on the other, it must manage the economic and strategic consequences of a war on its own doorstep. It's an uncomfortable position but potentially a very important one - if Europe knows how to use it.

Today's summit also discusses $225 billion in frozen Russian assets, mostly held in Belgium. The Belgian government is nervous: it wants iron-clad guarantees from other European countries before touching that money. This isn't bureaucracy for its own sake - it's the point where international law, property rights, and geopolitics collide. Whoever controls these assets controls an important lever for the future.

And then there's a piece of news that's gone almost unnoticed but is fundamental: the EDIP, the European Defence Industry Programme, has just received political agreement. It's €1.5 billion for the 2025-2027 period, with a clear rule: at least 65% of components must come from Europe or associated countries. It seems a small amount, but it's the first systematic framework for European defence autonomy - not a temporary emergency measure, but permanent architecture.

In the background, there's a fact that European officials repeat privately: they believe Russia could be ready to attack another European country within 3-5 years. This isn't talk-show alarmism - it's a time constraint that defines the urgency of everything happening now.

The two possible scenarios

This combination of pressures can produce two completely opposite results. Let's look at both in detail.

Scenario 1: Europe that works

In this scenario, Europe uses all these pressures as a catalyst for genuine transformation. The political agreement on EDIP quickly translates into concrete industrial contracts. European arms manufacturers receive orders, hire staff, increase production. Not paper, but metal and technology.

The frozen Russian assets are actually used. Belgium receives the guarantees it wants, a legal formula is found that holds water, and those $225 billion begin financing Ukrainian and European defence. They don't remain stuck in endless legal disputes.

Strategic stockpiles of critical materials - rare earths, semiconductors, key components - are created despite resistance from national lobbies with commercial interests in China. European countries accept paying a bit more in the short term to have security in the long term.

The "coalition of the willing" - those 30+ countries actively supporting Ukraine who will meet in London on Friday - becomes a model of rapid cooperation that's then integrated into official EU structures. Not a permanent bypass of European institutions, but a way to accelerate when necessary.

In this scenario, within 12-18 months we'll see tangible results: new defence contracts signed, production increased, stockpiles created, military coordination improved. Europe will have demonstrated it can convert pressure into capability.

Scenario 2: Europe that stalls

In the other scenario, what's already happened many times in recent European history occurs again: good intentions don't translate into concrete actions.

EDIP remains another document. Political agreement doesn't lead to industrial contracts because each country wants factories on its territory, every government protects its national champions, every industrial lobby pushes for its specifications. Amidst disputes over who produces what and where, months and years pass. Meanwhile, American and Asian companies continue winning tenders because they're already prepared.

The Russian assets knot gets tangled. Belgium wants guarantees no one will give. Hungary threatens veto. Legal experts debate whether it's permissible under international law. Committees are formed to study the matter. Six months pass, a year, two years. The money remains frozen, unused.

Strategic stockpiles aren't created because it would cost too much and countries with strong commercial ties to China don't want to irritate Beijing. Fine declarations are made about the need for independence, but in practice everyone continues buying from whoever costs least, even if it's strategically risky.

The "coalition of the willing" increasingly separates from official EU institutions. Those who want to act quickly do so through that coalition. The European Council becomes more and more a place where general speeches are made whilst real decisions are taken elsewhere. Europe fragments between those who want to be serious and those who prefer the status quo.

In this scenario, within 12-18 months we won't see substantial changes. There will have been many summits, many press releases, but European defence capacity will be essentially the same as today. When the next shock arrives - and it will - Europe will still be dependent on others.

What history tells us

Attempts at institutional transformation under pressure rarely work. Not because the people involved are incompetent, but because bureaucratic structures have their own timescales and logic, which rarely align with the urgency of external events.

Europe is particularly vulnerable to this problem because decisions require consensus from 27 countries with different interests. When all goes well, this system produces stability. When speed and decisiveness are needed, it produces paralysis.

The "coalition of the willing" is interesting precisely because it bypasses this problem. It's smaller, more flexible, faster. But it creates another risk: if important decisions are taken there, what remains of official European institutions?

The signals to watch

How will we understand which scenario is materialising? There are several clear indicators to monitor in coming months:

Speed of EDIP conversion: How long passes from political agreement to first concrete industrial contracts? If six months from now there's still nothing tangible, it's a terrible signal.

Decision on Russian assets: Is an operational decision taken within the year or does the topic remain in endless discussion? If by February 2026 we're still discussing legal aspects without having used a single euro, the answer is clear.

Cohesion vs fragmentation: Does the European position remain united or do we see increasingly parallel actions by the "coalition of the willing" whilst EU institutions become marginal?

Reaction when Trump returns to the table with Putin: Because he will, sooner or later. At that moment, will Europe have built enough autonomous capability to be a credible actor or will it still be just a spectator hoping to be heard?

The essential point

Europe finds itself in one of those historical moments where the very same external pressures can produce two completely opposite results. It can emerge from this crisis with increased real capabilities and genuine strategic independence. Or it can definitively discover that its institutional structures aren't suited to acting quickly when necessary.

It's not a question of will or declarations. All European leaders have been talking about "strategic autonomy" for years. It's a question of systemic capability: does Europe know how to translate intentions into actions quickly enough to matter, or not?

The next 6-12 months will give us the answer. And it will be an answer that defines Europe for coming decades, because these windows of opportunity don't reopen easily. Either Europe learns to move when the moment requires it, or it definitively becomes what many already suspect: an important economic actor but a political dwarf that talks whilst others decide.

History doesn't reward good intentions. It rewards those who know how to convert constraints into opportunities before the time window closes.